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Abstract 
 This study examines the trading activity of a large cross section of American bank 
holding companies upon various sub-events associated with the introduction of Basel III.  
An event study methodology was applied to various sub-composite portfolios, as 
determined by regulatory capitalization and leverage ratios.  The results suggest that 
statically significant abnormal negative returns occurred on the announcement to 
negotiate due to heightened regulatory uncertainty, especially amongst the least 
capitalized and highest leveraged banks.  However, this effect is complemented by 
statically significant positive returns upon the release of the initial guidelines.  Reactions 
to subsequent events report to be less significant.    
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I. Introduction 
 American Bank Holding Companies (BHC) were high volatility assets during the 
2008 financial crisis—both in enterprise value and reputational credence. With the 
detrimental defaults of financial institution heavyweights such as Lehman Brothers and 
Washington Mutual, banking regulations clearly needed updated guidelines.  In the wake 
of this crisis, both bankers and investors stood by for answers—ones that could not be 
addressed in the course of a day, a month, or even a year. The Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) ignited a process to overhaul the legacy banking regulatory 
framework.  
 Regulators from member nations entered into negotiations that would incorporate 
competing domestic agendas, of which the United States presented a key tenant. The 
American banking landscape is varied, diverse, and vast. Although much of the focus of 
the financial crisis fixated on various “too big to fail” institutions, every institution now 
took on a high degree of regulatory risk. Investors were forced to scan the field of possible 
data and adjust valuations accordingly.  
 Our study examines five distinct sub-events associated with the unveiling of Basel 
III. The results suggest that the value of BHC’s declined following the announcement of 
new regulation. However, as the details of the regulations become known, investors realize 
the incoming competitive advantages of existing American regulatory stringency. Overall, 
banks appear to have benefitted from the reactions to Basel III.  
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II.  Background 
Institutional and Regulatory Background 
 In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, the BCBS synthesized the economic 
disaster as to update necessary capitalization and liquidity requirements. The committee 
produced the single most “complete overhaul of U.S. bank capital standards since the U.S. 
adoption of Basel I in 1989” (Davis, Polk, & Wardell Visual Memo, 4). The banking accord 
strived to push regulatory framework in line with the relative risk of the global markets. 
Financial institutions’ enterprise values were directly affected by the ruling, with only 
certain excepted savings and loan holding companies and BHC’s not being strictly held to 
the guidelines.1  This piece of regulation forever perverted the course of banking.  
 Basel III follows its original foundation of Basel I and its logical reorganization, 
Basel II. The construction and unveiling of lasting financial regulation cannot simply be 
released in the course of a single day, but rather the unfolding of the final rules is comprised 
of various major sub-events. Table 1 chronicles these sub-events, but also provides insight 
into the publically available information for each corresponding date.2  The sub-events 
chosen for this study fall in line with those used in previous case studies, for consistency 
(Wilf 2013, 13). These sub-events each prompted various degrees of equity valuation 
speculation as investors developed a deeper understanding for the direction of regulation. 
Accordingly, these “surprise” press releases unleashed mixed trading sentiment across the 
financial services landscape (Wilf 2013, 29-32).  The BCBS operates with a veiled privacy 
                                                          
1 Refer to the Davis Polk & Wardell Visual Memo for more information on those few banks not forced to 
comply with Basel III 
2  See http://www.bis.org/list/press_releases/index.htm for a complete list of Basel III press releases 
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in attempt to ensure a competitive banking marketplace (Zaring 1998, 287-290). The 
details of discussion topics are never publically discussed. Rather information is 
transmitted through press releases. The releases vary in their timing, as the BCBS has 
sometimes opted to release details the same day as deliberations or released information 
weeks after formal meetings have concluded.  
The corresponding event-based trading rests in the uncertainty surrounding BCBS 
meetings. The economic significance of these events is predicated upon their result 
remaining fundamentally unknown. Hence, the fact that the BCBS participants actively 
negotiate on behalf of their constituents legitimizes their effects on the markets with a semi-
strong or weak form of the efficient market hypothesis (Wilf 2013, 15).3  Sheila Bair, the 
US FDIC Chairman throughout the Basel III negotiations declared that the deliberations 
were decidedly fragmented in regards to the US banking landscape, as many of the largest 
financial interests found themselves in wildly varied capital and liquidity positions as a 
result of the residential credit crunch (Bair 2012, 257-272).  Hence, the press releases 
should be considered an introduction of legitimate new public information, as opposed to 
the confirmation of previously accepted information. 
Basel III’s Impact 
An essential component to this landmark regulation is its treatment of institutions 
with inequity—the capitalization guidelines will theoretically be calibrated with the 
perceived riskiness of an institution. Not all banks are regulated equally. Nor is it correct 
                                                          
3 Wilf posits that active negotiation is absent in G-20 summits, the content of which is widely 
preunderstood.   
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to suggest that Basel III’s predecessors did not attempt to adjust for riskiness with respect 
to setting appropriate calibration levels of regulatory capital. Basel III would ideally bring 
financial institutions back aligned with the perceived riskiness of the global markets. Banks 
are assigned acceptable guidelines as dictated by their risk profile: asset composition, 
capitalization, consolidated asset value, systemic importance, etc. All of which, in some 
form, are considered when judging regulatory compliance.  
Basel III overhauled the procedure for calculating risk-based capital ratios 
(RBCR). The basic components of any RBCR are as follows: 
𝑅𝐵𝐶𝑅 =
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
The new legislation, on the whole, requires higher minimum RBCR’s, as well as 
incentivizes banks to maintain capital buffers in excess of minimum requirements to avoid 
capital distribution lockups, penalties, and suspension of executive bonuses (Davis, Polk, 
& Wardell Visual Memo, 21).  It tightened the eligibility for adequate regulatory capital 
instruments, as well as adjusted the constitution of tangible common equity.  One of the 
most significant developments of the deployment of Basel III for the recalculation of risk-
weighted assets (RWA). The accord generally marked up the risk-weighted value of OTC 
derivatives, cleared derivatives, high volatility commercial real estate loans, certain home 
equity exposures, and the majority of securitizations.  Accordingly, higher assigned RWA 
values will render higher degrees of regulatory capital held against it. As banks are forced 
to comply with the capital guidelines, available leverage and profitability instruments 
become constrained, and thus banks must idiosyncratically forge their own.  (Davis, Polk, 
& Wardell Visual Memo, 20). The asset composition of respective banks will ultimately 
5 
 
play integral roles in the costs associated with current and future compliance. The exact 
effect of such will be discussed later in this paper.   
Not all banking organizations are subject to the same guidelines. For example, 
banks satisfying any of the following criteria must adopt the advanced approach to 
capitalization: greater than $250 billion of total consolidated assets, greater than $10 billion 
of on-balance sheet foreign exposures, or elects to do so with federal banking regulatory 
approval. The advanced approach sets separate guidelines for calculating RWA’s for those 
qualified banks. The equity-related regulatory transition between previous and the Basel 
III final guidelines is outlined in Figure 1 (Davis, Polk, & Wardell Visual Memo, 7, 21). 
The new rules built upon the previously-established two-tier system. A four percent tier 1 
equity ratio and a four percent tier 2 equity ratio for all banking institutions—a decidedly 
less elegant solution to financial and systemic risk management than its successor. The 
Basel III rule applies the globally-systemically important bank holding company 
surcharges to an internally determined list of banks with high enough counterparty risk to 
the global markets to warrant additional capital coverage. However, the Basel III final rule 
failed to outline the proposals for this additional surcharge, of which the final enforceability 
is more ambiguous. The common equity tier 1 countercyclical buffer only applies to banks 
adopting the advanced approach to risk-weighting and minimums are calibrated on a scaled 
for size and asset composition basis (Davis, Polk, & Wardell Visual Memo, 7, 20-21).     
The Anatomy of Capital Ratios 
 Regulatory capitalization fails to protect against expected losses. It is precisely 
intended for the opposite—to safeguard the economy from experiencing unexpected 
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banking losses with contagion potential to not only destroy value within the financial 
institution space but in peripheral industries as well. Traditional balance sheet items prove 
helpful in determining the financing strategy of a bank. Yet, it is important to note the 
limitations of such measures as book value of shareholder’s equity, as it fails to convey the 
solvency of the institution. The book value of shareholder’s equity theoretically functions 
as a proxy for the firm’s asset value to eclipse liabilities—hence the residual value of the 
firm. Narrowly defined, this can be solely constituted as retained earnings and common 
stock. Logically, there exist little nexus between total book equity and solvency, although 
the link is not entirely absent.  
 Regulatory capital attempts to disclose a financial institutions’ economic health by 
providing more narrowly defined conceptions of capital—that which can be used to pay 
creditors in the event of insolvency. It highlights and manipulates relevant balance sheet 
items to create proxies from which investors may draw conclusions about the bank’s 
financing strategy more transparently than possible using just basic EDGAR financial 
statements (Tarullo 2008, 265).  Narrowly defined capital comprises Tier 1. It can be easily 
deployed to settle financial / cash obligations less ambiguously than its broader-defined 
counterpart, Tier 2 capital. One of Basel III’s most impactful changes to the regulatory 
landscape is the call for additional capital tiers beyond the existing framework. As capital 
becomes increasingly narrowly defined, banks will be forced to adjust their financing 
strategies to comply with the ruling—a costly endeavor. However, the understanding that 
these costs be somewhat evenly distributed across the industry is misleading. Any given 
BHC’s financing and business strategy will inevitably inform the firm’s options for moving 
into compliance.  
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 In addition to the imposition of narrowly-defined regulatory capital, Basel III 
reevaluated the means of calculating RWA’s. These calculations discount or assign 
premiums to certain assets in an attempt to convey their operational capabilities in the event 
of insolvency, as well as the likelihood of experiencing unexpected losses (Tarullo 2008, 
111). The safest of assets (cash, guaranteed loans, synthetically-protected credits, etc.) can 
be risk-weighted as low as 0%, while more risky assets (highly leveraged credits, high 
volatility real estate) can be held at 100%. As a result, banks would be forced to hold an 
equity position that scales upwards with risk—dampening the profitability magnification 
of leverage. Basel III would ultimately assign some asset (certain OTC derivatives, equity 
exposures, unsettled transactions) risk weights well in excess of 100%, often as high as 
1250%—making the imposition of complementary equity holdings wildly costly (Davis, 
Polk, & Wardell, Risk Weights Tool).   Hence, the current capitalization and asset 
composition of banks will be affected in ways that are completely dependent on the final 
rulings, and small changes in such rules will yield mixed results for seemingly similar US 
BHC’s. 
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III.  Literature Review 
 There exists a critical mass of literature which examines equity returns of financial 
institutions across global markets upon the announcement of Basel III and its sub-events. 
Several additional papers proved relevant to this paper’s focus, as aspects of event studies 
chronicling equity returns for other financial regulatory fixtures, such as dividend and 
accounting policies, expounded some helpful analytical tools. Regardless of the focus, 
economists examined financial institution trading activity in attempt to highlight or dispel 
rumors of abnormal returns over a prudent time horizon.  
 Before we can examine Basel III’s impact on equity returns, it is helpful to establish 
the sentiment surrounding the broader financial regulatory landscape throughout this 
tumultuous point in time. Nine major pieces of regulation forged the observable set of 
events for Shafer (2013). The study examined Dodd-Frank, the Volcker Rule, Vickers 
Commission rulings, and Basel III, amongst others. Equity returns and CDS spreads of the 
largest European and US BHC’s were tested for abnormal returns, as compared against the 
market index—to which the results were mixed.  The market responded most radically to 
structural reforms, such as the Volcker rule and the Vickers Regime, although these effects 
appear to dampen with wider trading windows, suggesting that pending financial regulation 
disruption in the market is minor (Shafer 2013, 26-31).    
The events comprising the Basel III portion of the analysis also yielded mixed 
results. Basel III resulted in abnormal negative returns for US banks in regard to only a few 
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of the sub-events, yet did not produce abnormal returns for British, Swiss, and German 
banks. Most importantly, equity valuations slid for US banks on announcement of 
meetings, however saw no such change upon announcement of the new capital 
requirements. The European banks did not flinch at the formation and announcement of 
Basel III over 80 and 140 day trading windows, decisively longer than our study (Shafer 
2013, 26-29). 
 Wilf (2013) adopted an alternative approach to determining the existence of 
abnormal returns for the largest US BHC’s. En route, the study attempts to dispel rumors 
that banks kneaded the framework of Basel III in order to preserve firm value at the expense 
of global financial stability. Wilf accomplished this feat through comparing cumulative 
abnormal returns of each of the 45 largest US BHC’s with a bespoke counterfactual index. 
She identified a portfolio of non-financial firms whose trading activities historically 
correlate with that of each specific financial firm. On aggregate, the net effect of Basel III 
yielded negative abnormal cumulative returns, though these returns failed to be consistent 
across all sub-events (Wilf 2013, 29-32).  This study employed a larger trading window 
and focused on large-scale distributional effects of the regulation, as opposed to immediate 
investor reaction. This study failed to further breakdown the composition of the firms 
receiving the most robust abnormal returns, but rather questioned the credibility of the 
regulation, as speculators grew skeptical of the implementation of an international banking 
accord within a contentious domestic banking environment. Accordingly, Wilf discovered 
that investors deemed the regulatory framework as credible and affecting of bank equity 
value (Wilf 2013, 33).    
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 In light of Wilf’s recent discovery on behalf of US banks, Bruno (2014) examined 
Europe’s bank equity returns throughout the formation of Basel III. Although this study 
employed a more traditional event study methodology, it unveiled negative cumulative 
abnormal returns in anticipation of regulatory triggers. Moreover, banks across Europe 
failed to react homogeneously, as banks considered core members of the Eurozone 
witnessed outsized returns as compared to their counterparts on the geopolitical outskirts 
(Bruno 2014, 22-25).  In addition to geopolitical orientation, this study identified trends in 
liquidity and capitalization, as it became clear that more liquid banks saw larger abnormal 
negative returns as compared to less liquid banks. Yet, banks with higher tier 1 capital 
ratios saw larger negative cumulative returns than those less well capitalized (Bruno 2014, 
29). 
 Some of the relevant literature focuses on accounting discretion of banks in the 
midst of the crisis.  Huizinga and Laeven (2009) employed Tobin’s q, a useful metric to 
measure discounts and premiums associated with banking assets. Let MV be the market 
value of the bank, while Ai be the accounting value of the asset i and let Li be the accounting 
value of the liability i. As such, we can express the market value of the firm as below4:   
MV = ∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑎 𝐴𝑖 −  ∑ 𝑣𝑖
𝑙 𝐿𝑖 
                                                          
4 For the original exposition of Tobin’s q, reference Tobin (1969)  
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where 𝑣𝑖
𝑎 is the market value of the asset i and 𝑣𝑖
𝑙 is the market value of the liability i.5  
Thus, we may define q as the market value of equity of the bank plus the book value of all 
liabilities divided by book value of all assets as below:   
𝑞 =
𝑀𝑉 + ∑ 𝐿𝑖
∑ 𝐴𝑖
 
Basic substitution yields:  
𝑞 = 1 − ∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑎𝑎𝑖 +  ∑ 𝑑𝑖
𝑙𝑙𝑖 
Where 𝑑𝑖
𝑎 = 1 − 𝑣𝑖
𝑎, 𝑑𝑖
𝑙 = 1 − 𝑣𝑖
𝑙, 𝑎𝑖 =  
𝐴𝑖
∑ 𝐴𝑖
, and 𝑙𝑖 =  
𝐿𝑖
∑ 𝐴𝑖
. Accordingly, 𝑑𝑖
𝑎and 𝑑𝑖
𝑙 denote 
discounts implicit in the bank’s equity pricing of the firm’s underlying assets and liabilities 
relative to book value. Should the assets and liabilities be valued precisely at market value, 
q = 1. Any such perversion would imply that the market valuation of at least a single asset 
or liability differs from accounting value (Huizinga and Laevan 2009, 7-8).   
  
                                                          
5 DeYoung and Yon (2008) discuss that this measure ignores the fact that market value may be sensitive to 
the co-mingling of certain assets and liabilities (DeYoung and Yon 2008, 18-24) 
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IV.  Hypothesis 
Development 
The inspiration for this study began in the summer of 2015, when I accepted a job 
as an investment banking summer analyst within a global investment bank’s financing arm. 
That summer was spent learning the language of Basel III and regulatory networks. The 
contemporary salience of international banking accords appeals to my own interest in 
overlaying conjectural debate upon a quantitative inquiry.  
This study attempts to erode the mystique behind a number of fundamental 
questions in regards to banking regulation. How did investors anticipate Basel III would 
affect firm value?  Did investors consider the BCBS’ measures enforceable, and would 
regulators punish American banks due to their contribution to the crisis?   In what ways 
did the accord affect firm value differently across various American BHC profiles?  
Previous studies have examined these fundamental questions across the entire industry, 
however my time working as a practitioner made it evanescently clear that few banks 
operate similarly. However the question of how exactly they trade remained unclear. 
Capitalization presents just one of the many factors that influence future profitability, as 
well as investor sentiment towards such.  
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Notional Discussion on Regulatory Networks 
 Singer (2004) discusses the conditions under which international regulatory 
accords are implemented most harmoniously. The study posits that regulators often 
actively resist international regulatory cooperation. However, in times of heightened 
institutional pessimism regulators seek international harmonization as a means of quelling 
domestic political pressures to achieve stability. Should Singer’s framework hold true in 
this context, the extreme political pressure would catalyze cooperation to create a 
regulatory landscape that both enables BCBS-elected countries to compete internationally, 
but also satisfies domestic interests. Should investors deem this achievement 
implementable, American BHC’s (or some subset thereof) will benefit from a combination 
of reputational risk management and the rendering of a sustainable capital structure (Singer 
2004, 531-533).  
A critical component to understanding the conjectural debate of the origins of value 
within international regulation rests in the bifurcation between public and private goods.6  
The international banking accord can be examined as the first movement of codified bank 
capital minimums as a global public goods provision in the form of providing private goods 
for US BHC’s.7   
The public goods perspective posits that international accords usher in an era of 
heightened financial stability while maintaining competitive advantage across countries 
(Kapstein 1989, 337-341).  The appeal of financial stability to any regulator is intuitive. 
                                                          
6 Public good: non-rival, non-excludable. Private good: rival, excludable. 
7 See Kapstein (1989) and Oatley and Nabors (1998) for a more complete explanation.  These papers fixate 
on Basel I, however the same conceptual framework applies to Basel III. 
14 
 
Regulators prove their worth in balancing this imperative with domestic competitiveness. 
This tradeoff between profitability and stability has since been dubbed the “regulator’s 
dilemma” (Kapstein 1989, 323-324).  Kapstein (1989) argues that cooperation amongst 
regulators on international accords dampens this predicament, as it theoretically increases 
financial stability while holding competitiveness relatively constant. As such, financial 
stability is rendered a public good. 
Oatley and Nabors (1998) argue that adopting a private goods perspective suggests 
that heightened regulatory constraints increases the competiveness of firms in countries 
with existing regulatory stringency. The introduction of international accords and their 
subsequent implementation forces countries with lower existing regulatory stringency to 
be held to a higher capitalization standard, with the inverse holding true for economic zones 
with existing capital rules closer in line to the introduced augmentation (Oatley and Nabors 
1998, 36-37) . Hence, the accord could provide a private benefit to certain profiles of banks 
in disproportion to global competitors.  
 These competing views predict possible mixed results for US BHC’s. In the public 
goods case, Wilf argues that US bank firm value would be adversely affected due to 
compliance adjustment and operational repositioning costs (Wilf 2013, 7-11). The private 
goods case would benefit US banks, as their competitive advantage of existing regulatory 
stringency will be realized. The study performs lasso regressions on America’s largest 
banks to render that the competing effects yield a net negative effect on firm value. 
However, this strategy appears limiting in some regards. Projecting conclusions on the US 
banking industry using equity returns of only the largest banks fails to fully expound the 
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effect of the regulation. Absolutely useful, but Wilf’s study strives to draw conclusions 
about the banking system with these banks as proxies, while our study hopes to draw 
conclusions using a cross section of the industry. With American BHC’s bolstering varying 
existing capitalizations, the accord would affect banks asymmetrically—not just in market 
capitalization, but across RBCR’s, risk-based leverage ratios, and others metrics with 
similar implications.  
 Due to Basel III’s predecessors, the enforceability of the accord will likely not be 
challenged. Yet, the component documents of the rules are remarkably detailed, with the 
ultimate penalties being somewhat muddled beyond that of reputational risk (Davis, Polk, 
& Wardell Visual Memo, 21). The ruling forces investors to synthesize its contents, 
whether it be in analysis or in anticipation and adjust their conception of firm value 
accordingly. Hence, Basel III’s granularity will likely affect US banks on the industry level, 
but perhaps more definitively according to their capitalization characteristics. This study 
strives to gauge investor sentiment in the extreme short term.  
The Hypothesis 
 This study will test the existence of abnormal returns for various portfolios of US 
BHC’s equity returns. These abnormal returns will be considered a reality when a 
statistically significant residual (either positive or negative) value is discovered in excess 
of the expected trading path for that day. Hence, a generalized least squares (GLS) 
augmented fixed effects estimator will be employed to detect abnormal returns.  
 The regression analysis will utilize binary dummy variables to the effect that the 
corresponding constant will encapsulate pricing movements for banks in the examined 
16 
 
portfolio. Statistically significant positive constants would suggests banks in that portfolio 
have experienced firm value appreciation due to the corresponding events. The regulatory 
effects of a private good operates as the prominent distributional agent. The inverse holds 
for negative returns, as the public good effect has influenced investors to discount firm 
value. It is understood that the various sub-events will not yield similar results, as the 
volatile 15 months en route to the final ruling inevitably fostered competing viewpoints 
about the overall health of the banking sector (Dow 2010, 1-5). 
 In light of the available information set and previous literature, the following forms 
the fundamental platform of hypothesis the empirical analysis will address to demonstrate 
the ways Basel III affected firms with various capitalization characteristics.  
Hypothesis 1:  The cumulative effect of the accord will ultimately be accretive to firm value. 
Hypothesis 2: The initial investor reaction will negatively affect firm value due to 
regulatory uncertainty or expected punitive, noncompetitive capital measures. 
Hypothesis 3:  The limited release of the proposals will yield positive abnormal returns 
due to the elimination of some degree of regulatory risk, especially amongst the least well-
capitalized BHC’s. 
Hypothesis 4: Subsequent events will garner far less effect on firm value, both cumulatively 
and within certain characteristic groups, as investors synthesized the existing information 
set to conceptualize the lasting constraint of Basel III within the BHC space.  
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V.  Empirical Analysis 
Data 
We obtained daily closing stock and index prices using S&P Capital IQ for the 
period February 1st 2004 through January 31th of 2011 for the informational purposes of 
our study. The hypothesis testing focused on heterogeneous investment reactions to BCBS 
announcements in regards to Basel III’s final rules. Accordingly, financial statement and 
regulatory statement data was aggregated at the firm-wide level. S&P Capital IQ proved 
adequate in obtaining such data by using the industry-specific module to leverage FR 9-
YC forms filed publically through the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council’s 
National Information Center. This study relies heavily on both daily market returns and 
quarterly regulatory filings. Quarterly regulatory measures are assumed to remain constant 
throughout their relevant quarter, and no anticipatory changes were made. The implication 
of this method is regulatory capitalization was assumed to be constant throughout a period, 
while market capitalization fluctuates. 
As this study’s focus remains bank capitalization’s relationship with returns, bank 
selection became vital. Banks were not excluded from the selection pool on the basis of 
total consolidated assets or equity value, except for those whose values fell outside of Basel 
III’s applicability. The sample began with a list of 176 publically traded American BHC’s. 
Banks became ineligible for the sample should banking activities be determined to fall 
outside of its core competency or if the information set became incomplete at any point 
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during the data collection period.8  The final sample consisted of 113 banks, all of which 
contained the full information set and is listed on Table 2.  
Our study broke down the prevailing banks into various buckets, depending on the 
statistical test being performed. Regulatory data was used to generate leverage and capital 
ratios, including tier 1 leverage ratio, tangible tier 1 leverage ratio, tier 1 risk-based capital 
ratio, risk-weighted assets as a percentage of consolidated assets, and Tobin’s q was 
generated using EDGAR and regulatory filings. Tier 2 risk-based capital ratio was 
excluded from our sample due to incomplete information issues. Our study opted to 
trifurcate each of the mentioned capitalization measures into three buckets. The sorting 
criteria for each group is detailed in Table 3.  
The process for determining the sub-events of the BCBS’ announcement of the 
Basel III framework is as follows. The finalized list would only include actionable events 
executed in regards to the Basel III framework. The BCBS maintains a robust newsfeed 
from which all relevant publications are released.  Publications filed under their Basel III 
module, in addition to other relevant press releases, were examined for salience and gravity 
of content. While the BCBS released numerous documents examining specific facets of 
capitalization and liquidation in the wake of the financial crisis, this study selected 
documents and releases dealing with the entire Basel III capitalization framework. The 
trading window revolved around the ultimate release of relevant documents to the sub-
event, as opposed to the announcement of the BCBS meeting, as all BCBS meetings follow 
a public schedule, however the contents of such remain immediately private, then are 
                                                          
8 Eligible events include a delisting, or failure to file an FR 9-YC as a component of BHC requirements. 
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released at a later date. The three-day trading window begins on the day the documents are 
released. This window is narrow by design as to capture the essence of investor reaction to 
the regulation. 
Bruno (2014). examined the credibility of the media anticipating the events of the 
BCBS meeting in order to confirm that the released documents in fact disseminate new 
information to the market. The study found that although media substantially covered the 
topic, empirical analysis suggests that no such anticipation is apparent in the financial data 
(Bruno 2014, 17-19).  This discovery prompted our study to open the trading window on 
document release, not days prior. 
Methodology 
 The influence of Basel III sub-events on BHC public equity returns is examined 
through an event study approach. The daily abnormal return for a security i on day t is as 
follows:  
𝐴𝑅 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡) +∈𝑖 
Where Rit is the holding period return of the equity on day t, Rmt is the holding period return 
of a value-weighted index to reflect the market portfolio on day t, while 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 represent 
the GLS estimates for equity i. The CAPM market model parameters are generated using 
five years of trading data from the beginning of the observation period—August 2004-July 
2009. ∈𝑖 is a stochastic error term. The estimation window ends prior to the opening of the 
first trading window to prevent informational leakage into the observation period. For a 
single stock, the average one-day abnormal return from day t to day t+n is as follows:  
20 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 ∀ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡+𝑛
𝑖=𝑡
 
This study then applies a final term to the model of daily abnormal returns as such: 
𝐴𝑅 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡) + 𝛽𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝛽𝑗𝐷𝑘 +∈𝑖 
where 𝐷𝑘, represents a dummy variable that equals 1 for any bank which passes the criteria 
for the given event day and capitalization group. The nature of the various criteria are 
expounded later in this section. 𝛽𝑗 is the GLS estimator for the respective dummy variable. 
Each of the five sub-events corresponds to an appropriate measure, which in turn generates 
a new 𝛽𝑗 for a given trading window. 𝛽𝑡𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒  encapsulates a basic time-weighted 
adjustment to break the day-to-day trading momentum effects in the observation period.  
 Any study attempting to measure the trading effects of landmark legislation must 
also consider the cumulative wealth effect of the endeavor. Hence, did BHC’s stand to 
realize or destroy value through the announcement of Basel III?  To assess the overall 
impact in a given trading window, we aggregate the CARs for either all events or a single 
event (Wagster 1996, 1328-1331).  We then operate z-score tests to assess the significance 
of these returns where: 
𝐻0 : ∑ 𝛽𝑗 = 0 ∀ 𝑗 = {1,2,3,4,5} 
where 𝛽𝑗 is the coefficient on the dummy variable to the CAR for a corresponding event j. 
We then isolate the variable in which regulatory details were released to attempt to 
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separately understand the wealth effects of the actual legislation versus the signaling effect 
of forthcoming regulation.  
 Assessing the cumulative wealth effects of landmark regulation presents statistical 
turbidity. The ultimate goal of this study is not just to understand the effect of the unveiling 
of Basel III, but also to unpack the effect of the sub-events on various BHC capitalization 
profiles. The BHC’s were broken down to three distinct portfolios to identify groups that 
are less, adequately, and more capitalized with respect to each of the relevant metrics. The 
full list of calculated metric and the respective portfolio criterion are disclosed on TABLE 
3. BHC’s are not restricted from switching portfolio grouping across events as to maintain 
the integrity of contemporaneous effects of current capitalization. Hence, the number of 
observations deviates between events and capitalization buckets. Trading effects for 
respective capitalization groups were examined across all events and on a single-event 
basis.  
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VI.   Results and General Discussion 
The results of the regression analysis of a composite portfolio across all events is 
displayed in Table 4 – Table 10. This composite portfolio holds an equally-weighted value 
of all 113 BHC’s in this study, attempting to measure the cumulative effect across all 
events, as well as event by event. The cumulative effect yields a slightly positive, statically 
significant return at the ten percent level. The final cumulative effect posits that US BHC’s 
stood to benefit from the introduction of Basel III. American banks reap the benefit of the 
distributional effects of the accord’s private goods, as their competitive advantage as a 
more-developed regulatory environment produces value in excess of international 
competitors. Beyond the effects of the removal of financial uncertainty, investors unveiled 
their sentiments towards a more stable financial system, as the introduction of additional 
regulatory capital constraints will both decrease volatility and global earnings robustness. 
Investors rendered the benefits of stability more accretive to value than the dampening of 
future earnings in more advantageous economic climates, such as the US.    
In order to render the means by which the regulation affected US BHC’s across the 
sector, we must split the composite portfolio to several sub-composite portfolios and test 
for abnormal returns. Banks sorted into each analysis’ third group experienced the most 
frequent appreciation of equity pricing. Abnormal returns were detected in tier 1 leverage 
ratio, tier 1 risk-based capital ratio, and Tobin’s q at the 10 percent level, and within 
tangible tier 1 leverage ratio at the five percent level. The highest leveraged banks within 
the various constitutions of group three benefitted from the introduction of Basel III, as it 
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became understood that these banks will pivot towards compliance—generating 
significantly less discounted earnings. BHC’s belonging to the various group twos also 
experienced abnormal returns, with tangible tier 1 leverage ratio, tier 1 risk-based capital 
ratio, and risk-weighted assets as a percentage of total consolidated assets also experiencing 
abnormal returns. Moving farther up the capitalization chain, banks belonging to group one 
only saw abnormal returns when testing against RWA’s as a percentage of total 
consolidated assets, as banks holding what was currently considered higher-quality assets 
should reap the competitive benefits of a private good in excess of the low cost of pivoting 
towards compliance. 
The announcement of the agreement between BCBS members to overhaul the 
global banking regulatory framework saw extremely significant negative returns, as the 
CAR over the observation window yielded a -.43% regression metric—rejecting our null 
hypothesis of no abnormal returns. This adverse reaction most likely originates in investor 
sentiment in regards to increased regulatory risk. Barring any outsized optimism in regards 
to the ultimate benefits of the regulation, this reaction is expected. This expectation spurs 
from such regulatory risk incorporating into cash flow valuations en route to rendering an 
appropriate stock price. Put simply, event one can be viewed as spiking the associated 
discount rates of firm-related equity cash flows, as all US BHC’s will be subject to the new 
regulation at some point in the near or distant future (the enforceability timeline was 
unknown at the time). Riskier cash flows translate to a lower equity value. 
Being that the cumulative effect of event one yielded statically significant abnormal 
negative returns, it remains logical that the majority of capitalization groups also 
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experienced such returns. This logic is reflected in the results, however patterns of investor 
reactions emerge. With heightened regulatory uncertainty, we would expect less well-
capitalized BHC’s to witness equity devaluation. Banks belonging to group two and group 
three produced seven of the eight statistically significant negative return values. Banks with 
higher tier 1 leverage ratios were negatively affected, however banks with lower tangible 
tier 1 leverage ratios also experienced devaluation. Banks with high tangible leverage ratios 
relative to basic leverage ratios report a higher percentage of assets being intangible—
hence having less value in a solvency event. In light of this, our result follows the logic 
that investors punish banks who report high leverage, but curiously those with low tangible 
leverage as well. This apparent logical schism between the treatments of these groups most 
likely originates in investor skepticism towards the tangibility of such assets.  Simply, 
banks with the lowest tangible leverage ratios relative to basic leverage ratios are most 
likely to have overstated the tangibility of their assets in the past, and Basel III would most 
likely punish them for this overstatement.  By the introduction of Basel III, many banks 
had already taken massive intangible asset write-downs, and it appears investors might 
anticipate more to follow. Similarly, statically significant negative returns were detected in 
the groups with the highest Tobin’s q values. Investors recognize that previous reporting 
practices might prompt investors to rethink past market premiums placed on assets or 
liabilities. Assuming Basel III will punish banks with highest premiums on their assets, 
investors reacted poorly to the announcement to negotiate.  
Event two appears to erase the detrimental effects of the previous announcement. 
The publication of select proposals on behalf of the BCBS offered investors the first flavor 
of the regulation. Investors recognized that the forthcoming proposals would most likely 
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be accretive to firm value. Hence, American banks will benefit from their existing system 
atop the financial regulatory hierarchy.  
Breaking the composite portfolio down to respective capitalization groups, patterns 
emerge that are in some respects complementary to the announcement to negotiate. The 
distributional effects of America’s current regulatory constraints will provide a meaningful 
safeguard against the drawbacks of being undercapitalized. In fact, it appears that the 
reactions put forth in the previous event was unjustified, as the release of select regulatory 
details convinced investors that the most leveraged banks will benefit from the need to 
comply with Basel III in excess of the costs. Less leveraged banks saw a far less significant 
accretion of equity value. Those with the lowest RWA as a percentage of total consolidated 
assets saw equity appreciation. Those with currently advantageous RWA constructions will 
certainly be less affected than those banks with higher risk assets, as the recalculation of 
RWA’s presented one of the key tenants of Basel III’s updates. Yet on the whole, 
seemingly more aggressive banks saw appreciation due to the understanding that Basel III 
will not destroy their viability beyond the benefits of a more-stable domestic banking 
system. Put metaphorically, a rising financial tide will raise a boat much higher than 
expected when the boat is perceived to be leakier than it is.  
Event three comprised no statistically significant cumulative effect on the entire 
composite portfolio. It saw the BCBS’ announcement of their settlement upon the final 
rules, however the granular details of the revised rules were released at a later date. This 
result suggests that investors failed to recognize the salience of this event on the ultimate 
effect of bank valuation. The cumulative effect of this event fails to be statically significant 
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at the ten percent level, yet is significant at a level just above it. As such, the cumulative 
effect is not meaningless. The corresponding GLS estimator is decisively closer to 0 than 
the previous two events months earlier. Event three showcases evidence of investor 
disenchantment with the rulings, with cumulative effects beginning to dampen and 
significant abnormal returns within sub-composite portfolios becoming more infrequent. 
Subsequent events reflect a deepening of this sentiment and will be discussed later.  
Event three witnessed statistically significant abnormal returns on four sub-
composite portfolios. They were tangible tier 1 risk based leverage ratio and tier 1 risk-
based capital ratio within group 2, and tier 1 leverage ratio and Tobin’s q within group 3. 
Similarly to the previous events, higher leveraged BHC’s and those with seemingly higher 
quality assets experienced positive abnormal returns. This reaction can be held in similar 
regard to the reaction to event two. The arrival of the final rules, although not public, can 
be seen as a reduction in overall regulatory risk—as the fact that the BCBS has reached 
some form of a final product and those banks with the highest regulatory risk benefit most 
definitively from a reduction in such. 
Event four failed to yield any cumulative abnormal return, despite the release of the 
final regulatory details. This response, or rather lack thereof, posits that investors already 
adopted viewpoints on how Basel III would affect BHC valuation. When the final details 
were released, some evidence of meaningful perversions of expected trading paths remain, 
however such evidence is minimal. Until the final costs of compliance are calculated, 
investor sentiment on the effect of Basel III will not be corroborated. From the lack of 
reaction or regulatory details we can more easily draw conclusions about investor 
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confidence, not effectiveness in synthetization. Only a single sub-composite portfolio 
experienced abnormal returns—tangible tier 1 leverage ratio’s group two. Perhaps simply 
a continuation of event three’s reaction to the portfolio, as no discernable pattern can 
reasonably be rendered from this single measure.  
Event Five continued to showcase confidence on behalf of investors. This study 
brought no evidence of statistically significant returns, either cumulatively or within a sub-
composite portfolio, at the release of the final rules. Investor apathy is certainly not the 
most salient understanding of this reaction. Given the volatility of bank valuation in prior 
sub-events, banking valuations already changed their expected trading contour in order to 
incorporate relevant Basel III items. The affirmations of capitalization requirements 
presented no such material information to move equity values of BHC’s. This finding does 
not imply that the final rules failed to have a material effect on banking valuations, as 
reactions of previous events would suggest otherwise. Moreover, the ultimate effect of 
Basel III’s final rules might not be inconsequential.  A visceral reaction on behalf of 
investors could be perceptually substituted with the aggregate effect of the regulation 
transpiring over longer-term trading windows as investors come to gain an organic 
understanding of its implications.  This notion invites future research. 
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VII.  Conclusion 
 Much of what makes the study of regulatory networks compelling is their 
undeniable importance and need to incorporate conjectural components into any desired 
outcome. The existence of the regulator’s dilemma alone invites practitioners to understand 
potential wealth transfers between constituents of regulatory frameworks. These transfers 
can occur within a closed system, or it can be delivered from an exogenous force. 
 This event study discovered that the sub-events comprising the release of Basel III 
constitute a salient gateway to the emotionality of investors. With sentiments shaken in the 
financial crisis, investors scrambled to adjust valuations to reflect riskiness of the 
marketplace—one which bolstered regulatory risk as a lasting constraint. American BHC’s 
seemed to brace for a detrimental blow to equity value, before rallying on the understanding 
that the group of banks would benefit from its current position of regulatory stringency. 
Basel III was perceived to increase American bank value through its establishment of a 
more stable international banking system. Although future earnings robustness is 
ultimately dampened through heightened capitalization requirements, American banks 
operating within a fundamentally stronger global marketplace is certainly helpful. 
However, the beneficial distributional effects of the costs of compliance presents a more 
likely explanation of our results.  
 This study is limited in that it relies heavily on theoretical conjecture to render 
understandings about bank equity valuation in the wake of extreme downward volatility. 
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A relatively short trading window attempts to capture the visceral reactions prompted by 
the regulatory fallout. While this fallout can certainly be detected, knowing the absolute 
motivations behind this trading activity will remain somewhat speculative.  Future research 
will hopefully demystify some degree of this speculation.   
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IX.  Appendix 
Table 1- Event Timing Details 
 
 
Figure 1 – Capitalization Changes 
 
 
 
 
Event Event BCBS BCBS  Press Days Between Regulatory
Number Description Meeting Date Release Date Meeting and Release Details (Y/N)
1 Agreement to Negotiate 2009 Sept 6 2009 Sept 7 1 No
2 Preliminary Proposals 2009 December 8-9 2009 Dec 17 8 Yes
3 Announcement of Final Rules 2010 July 14 - 15 2010 Jul 26 11 No
4 Minimum Levels Release 2010 Sept 12 2010 Sep 12 0 Yes
5 Final Rules Release 2010 Nov 30 - Dec 1 2010 Dec 16 15 Yes
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Table 2 – List of BHC’s 
 
Ticker Company Name Ticker Company Name
NasdaqGS:SRCE 1st Source Corporation NYSE:KEY KeyCorp.
NasdaqGS:ABCB Ameris Bancorp NasdaqGS:LKFN Lakeland Financial Corp.
NYSE:BAC Bank of America Corporation NYSE:MTB M&T Bank Corporation
NYSE:BOH Bank of Hawaii Corporation NasdaqGS:MCBC Macatawa Bank Corp.
NasdaqCM:BMRC Bank of Marin Bancorp NasdaqGS:MBFI MB Financial Inc.
NasdaqGS:OZRK Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. NasdaqGS:MBTF MBT Financial Corp.
NasdaqGS:BANR Banner Corporation NasdaqGS:MBWM Mercantile Bank Corp.
NYSE:BBT BB&T Corporation NasdaqGS:MBVT Merchants Bancshares Inc.
NasdaqGS:BBCN BBCN Bancorp, Inc. NasdaqGS:NPBC National Penn Bancshares Inc.
NasdaqGS:BPFH Boston Private Financial Holdings, Inc. NasdaqGS:NBTB NBT Bancorp, Inc.
NasdaqGS:BMTC Bryn Mawr Bank Corp. NasdaqGS:NTRS Northern Trust Corporation
NasdaqGS:CCBG Capital City Bank Group Inc. NasdaqGS:NRIM Northrim Bancorp Inc.
NYSE:COF Capital One Financial Corporation NasdaqCM:ORRF Orrstown Financial Services Inc.
NasdaqCM:CACB Cascade Bancorp NasdaqGS:PCBK Pacific Continental Corp.
NasdaqGS:CATY Cathay General Bancorp NasdaqGS:PMBC Pacific Mercantile Bancorp
NasdaqGS:CSFL CenterState Banks, Inc. AMEX:PRK Park National Corp.
NasdaqCM:CFCB Centrue Financial Corporation NasdaqGS:PGC Peapack-Gladstone Financial Corp.
NasdaqGS:CNBK.A Century Bancorp Inc. NasdaqGS:PNFP Pinnacle Financial Partners Inc.
NYSE:C Citigroup Inc. NasdaqGS:BPOP Popular, Inc.
NasdaqCM:CZNC Citizens & Northern Corp. NYSE:PB Prosperity Bancshares Inc.
NasdaqGS:CCNE CNB Financial Corp. NYSE:RF Regions Financial Corporation
NasdaqGS:COLB Columbia Banking System Inc. NasdaqGS:STBA S&T Bancorp Inc.
NYSE:CMA Comerica Incorporated NasdaqGS:SASR Sandy Spring Bancorp Inc.
NasdaqGS:CBSH Commerce Bancshares, Inc. NasdaqGS:SBCF Seacoast Banking Corp. of Florida
NasdaqCM:COB CommunityOne Bancorp NasdaqGS:BSRR Sierra Bancorp
NasdaqGS:CNOB ConnectOne Bancorp, Inc. NasdaqGS:SFNC Simmons First National Corporation
NasdaqCM:EGBN Eagle Bancorp, Inc. NasdaqGS:SSB South State Corporation
NasdaqGS:EWBC East West Bancorp, Inc. NasdaqGS:SBSI Southside Bancshares Inc.
NYSE:FNB F.N.B. Corporation NasdaqGS:SYBT Stock Yards Bancorp, Inc.
NasdaqGS:FITB Fifth Third Bancorp NYSE:SCNB Suffolk Bancorp
NasdaqGS:FISI Financial Institutions Inc. NasdaqGS:SNBC Sun Bancorp Inc.
NasdaqGS:FBNC First Bancorp NYSE:STI SunTrust Banks, Inc.
NYSE:FBP First Bancorp NasdaqGS:SIVB SVB Financial Group
NasdaqGS:BUSE First Busey Corporation NYSE:SNV Synovus Financial Corporation
NasdaqGS:FCNC.A First Citizens Bancshares Inc. NYSE:TCB TCF Financial Corporation
NasdaqGS:FFBC First Financial Bancorp. NasdaqGS:TCBI Texas Capital BancShares Inc.
NYSE:FHN First Horizon National Corporation NYSE:BK The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation
NasdaqGS:FMBI First Midwest Bancorp Inc. NYSE:SCHW The Charles Schwab Corporation
NasdaqGS:FUNC First United Corporation NasdaqGS:FNLC The First Bancorp, Inc.
NasdaqGS:FMER FirstMerit Corporation NYSE:PNC The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc.
NasdaqGS:GABC German American Bancorp Inc. NasdaqGS:TOWN Towne Bank
NasdaqGS:GBCI Glacier Bancorp, Inc. NasdaqGS:TCBK TriCo Bancshares
NasdaqGS:GSBC Great Southern Bancorp Inc. NasdaqGS:TRMK Trustmark Corporation
NasdaqGS:GBNK Guaranty Bancorp NYSE:USB U.S. Bancorp
NasdaqGS:HMPR Hampton Roads Bankshares Inc. NasdaqGS:UMBF UMB Financial Corporation
NasdaqGS:HBHC Hancock Holding Company NasdaqGS:UMPQ Umpqua Holdings Corporation
NasdaqGS:HTLF Heartland Financial USA, Inc. NasdaqGS:UBSH Union Bankshares Corporation
NasdaqGS:HTBK Heritage Commerce Corp. NasdaqGS:UBSI United Bankshares Inc.
NasdaqGS:HFWA Heritage Financial Corporation NasdaqGS:UCBI United Community Banks, Inc.
NasdaqGS:HOMB Home Bancshares, Inc. (Conway, AR) NYSE:VLY Valley National Bancorp
NasdaqGS:HBNC Horizon Bancorp NasdaqGS:WASH Washington Trust Bancorp Inc.
NasdaqGS:HBAN Huntington Bancshares Incorporated NasdaqGS:WSBF Waterstone Financial, Inc.
NasdaqGS:IBKC IberiaBank Corp. NYSE:WBS Webster Financial Corp.
NasdaqGS:INDB Independent Bank Corp. NYSE:WFC Wells Fargo & Company
NasdaqGS:IBCP Independent Bank Corporation NasdaqGS:WABC Westamerica Bancorp.
NYSE:JPM JPMorgan Chase & Co. NYSE:WAL Western Alliance Bancorporation
NasdaqGS:ZION Zions Bancorporation
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Table 3 – Capitalization Group Criteria 
 
Table 4 – Results for all BHC’s across All Events 
 
Ratio Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio < .08 .08-.10 >.10
Tangible Tier 1 Leverage Ratio < .09 .09-.12 >.12
Tier 1 Risk-based Capital Ratio < .12 .12-.15 >.15
Risk-weighted Assets / Total Consolidated Assets < .75 .75-.80 >.80
Tobin's q <. 97 .97-1.02 >1.02
Composite Portfolio Across Events All Banks
All Events 0.0014
0.082
Event 1 -0.0043
0.012
Event 2 0.0048
0.010
Event 3 0.0027
0.114
Event 4 0.0016
0.357
Event 5 0.0018
0.307
The above statistics show the βj as a result of the GLS regression with the corresponding p-value below. 
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Table 5 – Grouped BHC’s across All Events 
 
Table 6 – Grouped BHC’s, Event One 
 
Composite Portfolios - All Events Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 0.0012 0.0008 0.0020
0.617 0.442 0.054
Tangible Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 0.0006 0.0017 0.0036
0.677 0.084 0.041
Tier 1 Risk-based Capital Ratio 0.0004 0.0021 0.0024
0.789 0.010 0.071
Risk-weighted Assets / Total Consolidated Assets 0.0018 0.0018 0.0002
0.063 0.067 0.880
Tobin's q 0.0014 0.0012 0.0019
0.496 0.289 0.052
The above statistics show the βj as a result of the GLS regression with the corresponding p-value below. 
Sub-composite Portfolios - Event One Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio -0.0055 -0.0037 -0.0055
0.290 0.091 0.026
Tangible Tier 1 Leverage Ratio -0.0053 -0.0051 0.0033
0.067 0.018 0.542
Tier 1 Risk-based Capital Ratio -0.0040 -0.0081 0.0057
0.198 0.010 0.262
Risk-weighted Assets / Total Consolidated Assets -0.0031 -0.0039 -0.0071
0.213 0.397 0.011
Tobin's q -0.0039 -0.0056 -0.0040
0.307 0.052 0.061
The above statistics show the βj as a result of the GLS regression with the corresponding p-value below. 
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Table 7 – Grouped BHC’s, Event Two 
 
Table 8 – Grouped BHC’s, Event Three 
 
Sub-composite Portfolios - Event Two Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 0.0058 0.0030 0.0075
0.303 0.161 0.002
Tangible Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 0.0043 0.0039 0.0114
0.151 0.075 0.004
Tier 1 Risk-based Capital Ratio 0.0027 0.0062 0.0101
0.404 0.010 0.010
Risk-weighted Assets / Total Consolidated Assets 0.0063 0.0035 0.0038
0.010 0.422 0.201
Tobin's q 0.0013 0.0076 0.0083
0.736 0.007 0.001
The above statistics show the βj as a result of the GLS regression with the corresponding p-value below. 
Sub-composite Portfolios - Event Three Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio -0.0006 0.0035 0.0039
0.915 0.133 0.079
Tangible Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 0.0013 0.0044 0.0036
0.673 0.047 0.321
Tier 1 Risk-based Capital Ratio 0.0010 0.0058 0.0012
0.794 0.01 0.637
Risk-weighted Assets / Total Consolidated Assets 0.0021 0.0061 0.0032
0.297 0.245 0.378
Tobin's q 0.0060 -0.0001 0.0052
0.234 0.967 0.020
The above statistics show the βj as a result of the GLS regression with the corresponding p-value below. 
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Table 9 – Grouped BHC’s, Event Four 
 
Table 10 – Grouped BHC’s, Event Five 
 
Sub-composite Portfolios - Event Four Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 0.0015 0.0004 0.0029
0.773 0.879 0.187
Tangible Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 0.0002 0.0042 -0.0009
0.944 0.056 0.813
Tier 1 Risk-based Capital Ratio 0.0004 0.0032 0.0015
0.91 0.15 0.564
Risk-weighted Assets / Total Consolidated Assets 0.0020 0.0020 0.0013
0.338 0.709 0.72
Tobin's q 0.0028 0.0016 0.0012
0.574 0.466 0.614
The above statistics show the βj as a result of the GLS regression with the corresponding p-value below. 
Sub-composite Portfolios - Event Five Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 0.0057 0.0008 0.0006
0.295 0.731 0.791
Tangible Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 0.0028 0.0013 0.0013
0.371 0.55 0.727
Tier 1 Risk-based Capital Ratio 0.0034 0.0021 -0.0003
0.381 0.349 0.904
Risk-weighted Assets / Total Consolidated Assets 0.0013 0.0022 0.0039
0.513 0.666 0.98
Tobin's q 0.0049 0.0020 -0.0005
0.366 0.382 0.774
The above statistics show the βj as a result of the GLS regression with the corresponding p-value below. 
